connecting to rule-makers in order to set favorable rules (lobbying) or paying government executives to bend the current rule (bribing) are the two main strategies for influencing government. This study in an Evolutionary game model explain why bribing may become widespread while other states like compliance and cooperative lobbying are Pareto superior. The theoretical model is used to study the effect of social parameters on firm’ s choice between lobbying and bribing. The results indicate that social disapproval of bribery has a negative impact on corruption. The effect, however, depends on the history of countries. Countries with a long history of corruption have much more difficult task in fight with corruption. Cooperation was the second social factor to be investigated. The effect of cooperation on lobbying is indirect through alleviating the difficulty and costs of linking to the government. Whenever and wherever linking is difficult, firms by cooperation, can make it less impeding.

Innovations, commercialized by new or old established firms, located at the core of industrial renewal process. The innovation concept has suffered transformations, along with the evolution of the models that try to explain and understand the innovation process. The innovative process corresponds to all activities that generate technological changes and the dynamic interaction between them, not necessarily being novelties. Linier model, Chain-Linked Model and National Innovation Systems (NIS) Approach, are three models that have developed for innovation process. Innovation process can be viewed as Evolutionary process. One can recognize some mechanism for innovation evolution. These are grouped into two classes; those that increase configurations variation and those that decrease it. Emergence of knowledge, knowledge flow and recombination are the mechanism to increase variation of configuration. Internal and external selections are the mechanism to selecting. Innovation operators are Evolutionary operators that create new combinations of configuration and increase variation. This paper develops an Evolutionary cycle in innovation process and extends Evolutionary mechanisms of innovation.